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<app-group>
<app id="sec_A"><label>APPENDIX A</label><title>ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON TEST PROCEDURES</title>
<sec id="sec_A.1">
<label>A.1</label><title>SCOPE</title>
<sec id="sec_A.1.1"><label>A.1.1</label><title>Scope</title>
<p>This appendix is a mandatory part of this specification. The information contained herein is intended for compliance. This appendix is to provide additional information to the user of this specification in performing the voltage standing wave ratio, RF leakage, and insertion loss tests.</p>
</sec>
</sec>
<sec id="sec_A.2">
<label>A.2</label><title>TEST TYPES</title>
<sec id="sec_A.2.1"><label>A.2.1</label>
<p>Voltage standing wave ratio (see <underline>4.6.11</underline>).</p>
<sec id="sec_A.2.1.1"><label>A.2.1.1</label><title>Test connector</title>
<p>The standard test-connector interface shall be in accordance with <std><underline><std-ref type="undated">MIL-STD-348</std-ref></underline></std>. The standard test connector impedance shall be 50 ± 0.5 ohms.</p>
</sec>
</sec>
</sec>
<sec id="sec_A.3">
<label>A.3</label><title>MEASUREMENTS</title>
<sec id="sec_A.3.1"><label>A.3.1</label>
<p>RF leakage (see <underline>4.6.23</underline>).</p>
<sec id="sec_A.3.1.1"><label>A.3.1.1</label><title>Measurement technique</title>
<p>The measurement of the leakage from connectors is performed by collecting the leakage energy in a coaxial system surrounding the leakage source. An outline of the instrumentation is shown on figure 7.</p>
<p>For direct leakage measurements the adjustable short circuit serves several purposes.</p>
<p>The short-circuit position is adjusted to assure that an adequately low impedance appears behind the equivalent leakage generator. A matched termination can be substituted, but the resulting 6-dB loss cannot be tolerated in some cases. In addition, if the leakage source is directional, as it indeed is for connectors with multiple leakage, it is possible for the leakage to be directed to this termination at some frequencies and not collected by the detector. For surface transfer-impedance measurements on connectors with leakage from more than one point in the connector, however, a matched termination is desirable in order to simplify the transformation of the measured data to absolute transfer impedance data. This is not needed to make relative comparisons in this test.</p>
</sec>
</sec>
</sec>
</app>
</app-group>
</back>

Bibliography and reference items are distinct from normative references, which are indispensable to the application of the standard.

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